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Introduction
Interactive decision situations with more than one decision maker and in which multiple objectives play a role, can be modelled by means of multicriteria games, an alternative name for games with vector payoffs.
A pioneering paper which deals with multicriteria games is Blackwell (1956) . Here an analog of the minimaz theorem is provided for repeated zero-sum games with vector payoffs based on the concepts of approachability~excludability of subsets of payoff vectors. Shapley (1959) defined the notion of equilibrium points for (one-shot) two person games with vector payoffs and showed the correspondence between equilibria and Nash equilibria of so-called trade-off bimatrix games.
For zero sum games this approach is elaborated in Zeleny (1976) , Nieuwenhuis (1983) and Corley (1985) , for non-zero sum games in Borm, van den Aarssen and Tijs (1988) , who also provide a geometric description for small games, and in Ghose and Prasad (1989) . Applications of zero-sum bicriterion games to combat games can be found in Prasad and Ghose (1988) .
Existence theoreme for equilibria in games with vector payoffs are provided in Wang (1991) .
Up to now a multicriteria analysis has attracted relatively little attention in the game theory literature although the decision theoretic counterpart w.r.t. multiobjective programming is rather well-developed. We refer to Cochrane and Zeleny (1973) , Cohon (1978) and more recently F`rench et al. (1983) and Chankoag and Haimes (1983) . In our opinion multicriteria games can be of use in modelling various real-life situations where several objectives have to be taken into account such as in politics and management decisions, especially in situations in which the agents do not have an a priori opinion on the relative importance of the components of the payoff vector.
This paper aims for a refinement theory for (weak) equilibria for non zero-sum multicriteria games based on ideas and insights of the extensive literature on refinements for Nash equilibria in unicriterium games (cf. van Damme (1991) ). In particular we introduce perfect equilibrium points in the sense of Selten (1975) . Throughout the paper an example of a mnlticriteria production-inspection game illustrates the notions of equilibrium points, perfect equilibrium points and related trade-off games.
Section 2 contains the aecessary definitions of multicriteria games and weak equilibrium points and recalls the correspondence between weak equilibria and Nash equilibria of related trade-off games.
Section 3 extends the characterization of a Nash equilibrium, the carriers being subsets of the best reply sets, to equilibrium points for multicriteria games in the sense that the carriers have to be subsets of a so-called efficient pure best reply set. This characterization also reveals the possibility to order the strategies by means of levels of best reply sets, thus providing a first indication towards a properness concept à la Myerson (1978) .
The definition of perfect equilibzia by means of perturbed games is generalized towards multicriteria games in section 4. Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown using the characterization of equilibrium points given in section 3.
Section 5 describes two alternative characterizatione of perfect equilibria à la van Damme (1991), one of them using the concept of e-perfectness. Here it is also seen that contrary to the result for equilibrium points, there is no exact correspondence between perfect equilibria and perfect Nash equilibria for the corresponding trade-off games.
Section 6 concludes with some remarks on the case when one would apply a weaker concept of domination, providing stronger equilibria.
Throughout the paper an example of a multicriteria production-inspection game illustrates the notions of equilibrium points, perfect equilibrium points and related trade-off games.
2
Equilibrium points for multicriteria games
We consider mixed extensions of n-person finite strategic multicriteria games. These are games with a player set N-{ 1, ..., n} in which each player i has a finite set of pure strategies S; -{8i1 i 8;2f .-. f 9;,,i~;~}.
Pure strategy combinations s-(sl, ..., e") E j-[~-1 S~provide to each player i npayoffe"
given by an r(i)-vector valued function K; : jj~-~S~~R'~'1, i.e. player i takes r(i) criteria into account. Considering mixed strategies we let 0(S;) represent the set of all probability measures on S; for each player i E N. The payoff functions K; are extended to the set jj~-1 0(S~) of all mixed strategy combinations in the obvious way.
A player's payoff is given by a vector instead off a scalar. Although usually a scalar-valued utility function is used, this definition covers cases where such functions are not explicitly available at first hand. Players may have no fixed opinion about the relative values of the vector coef6cients or it may be practically impossible to weight the different objectives (see also Shapley (1959) , Zeleny (1976) ). Still, in such games, without weights on the objectives, a domination concept can be defined, which leads to a natural generalization of the notion of Nash equilibria in unicriterium games. Let P C R~. Then x E P is undominated (in P) ií {y E R~~y 1 x} n P-0. In case r(i) -1 for all i E N we deal with a mixed extension of an ordinary finite unicriterium game and equilibrium points correspond to Nash equilibria.
Notice that we used the notion of strong dominance and so in fact consider weak equilibria (cf. Shapley (1959) ). This guarantees closedness of the equilibrium set, what we will use later on in the existence proof of perfect equilibrium points. In a sense this concept of domination is the atrongest option available. A player will only agree on deviation if the payoff in every criterium rises.
There is a correspondence between the equilibrium points of the game P and the Nash equilibria of the corresponding trade-off games in which the various objectives of the players are weighted.
DeRnition 2.1:
and trade-off vectors a(i) E Or~;~the trade-off unicriterium game I'(a) is defined ae the n-person game with (mixed) strategy spaces~(S;) and payoff functions
Theorem 2.2: ( Shapley ( 1959).
For any game I' E MG(n,(r(1),...,r(n))): EP(I') -{o~o E NE(I'(a)), a-(a(1),...,.1(n)) E II" 10r~;~} As a consequence of this theorem and the result that the set of Nash equilibria of a normal form game is non empty (Nash (1951) ) the set of equilibrium points is non empty.
As an illustration we consider a 2-person (2,2) multicriteria game which will also be used later on.
Example 2.3: A production-inspection game
Consider the 2-person (2,2) multicriteria game I' -(0(S, ), ... ,~(S"), Kl, .
where n-2, Sl -{I, NI }, S, -{H, NH} and the npayofP' functions Kl and K' are determined by the following two diagrams:
the payoff function Kl for player 1.
the payoff function Kz for player 2.
Here c denotes a real number larger than 1.
One could consider this example as corresponding to a situation of Hygienical labour and Inspection, in which a factory and a bureau of inspection aze the players. The factory has two objectives, to achieve some level of hygienical production and to minimize the production costa. The inspection bureau also has two objectives, to minimize inspection costs and to provide an acceptable level of hygiene in production.
The strategies the bureau can take are Inspection and No Inspection (I and NI in the diagrams). Those for the factory Hygienical production and Non Hygienical production
(H and NH).
So in the example player 1 corresponds to the bureau and player 2 to the factory. The fust coordinate of the payoff vector for player 1 depicts the negative costs (benefits) of inspection, the second coordinate depicts a satisíaction with he hygienical situation. The fust coordinate for the factory depicts extra negative production costs, the second represents a"hygienical" satisfaction level. In this context the number c might be interpreted as a penalty which can be imposed if the production fails to be hygienical.
Let p E (0,1] represent the strategy of player 1 in which the ptobability upon 1 is p and 1-p is the probability upon NI. For player 2 we assume q E [0,1] to represent the strategy in which H is played with probability q and NH with 1-q. 
The analysie above shows that equilibrium points in this simple model are thoae in which there is full inspection, those in which the factory produces in a hygienical way with probability 1 and those in which the chance upon inspection is amall but the production is hygienical with a fair chance. Moreover it is seen that a higher penalty c leads to a shrunk equilibrium aet and thereby to equilibria which favour a more hygienical production. A similar characterization for equilibria of multicriteria games is not straightforward since the fact that two pure strategies lead to undominated payoff vectors w.r.t some fixed strategy combination of the opponent does not imply that all probability measures on these two strategies lead to undominated payoff vectors. However, for multicriteria games we give a characterization of equilibrium points in terms of carriers and so called efficient best reply sets. Without proof we state theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2: Let I' E MG(n,(r(1),...,r(n.))) and o E]Ij-1~(S~). Then for all i E N a; E B;(I',o-;)~~C(I',a;) C I for some I E E;(I',v-;)
This theorem provides an opportunity to order the set of pure strategies into levels of best replies. A description of the procedure is given in section 6.
A perfectness concept for multicriteria games
The ideas in this section are related to the work of Selten (1975) . We define a perfect equilibrium point as a limit point of a sequence of equilibria of perturbed multicriteria
games.
Perturbed games are derived from the original game by demanding that every pure strategy has to be chosen with a positive probability. We therefore call a vector E-(El, E2, ..., En) E n;-1 Rml'1 a mistake vector if~mlil E~C 1 for all i E N and E~0.
Now we define the e-perturbed game I'(E) for a game P-(~(Sl ), . ..,~(S"), Kl, ..., K")
and a mistake vector E E Ij;-, Rm~'~. As pure strategy set for player i we take
Si(E) -19i1(E),...,9vn~;11E)}
where s;i(E) denotea the mixed strategy in~(S;) which gives probability Ek to s;k if k~t and probability 1-~k~~E), to s;i.
The payoff functions fot the game I'(E) are just the functions K; restricted to the new domain.
The E-perturbed game P(E) -(~(Sl(E)), . .., 0(S"(E)), Kl, ..., K") itself is an n-person
(r(1),...,r(n)) multicriterium game, so carriers, payoff polytopes and efficient pure best 9 reply sets are properly defined.
Notice that each mixed strategy in the perturbed game can be identified with a mixed strategy in the original game. Therefore, with minor abuse of notation, we obtain
0(S~(e)) C~( S;).
Ia theorem 4.1 we will show that the efficient pure best reply sets of player i w.r.t. a strategy o--; E j~ [~~; 0(S~(e) ) in both I' and I'(e) coincide. In the proof we will use the followïng mappings between the original and the perturbed strategy spaces for all i E N. Clearly, f; is continuous, dominance preseruing and óijective where
Let f; : 0(S;) -~0(S;(e)) be defined by f,(o;)(s;i(E)) :-v;(s;i)

f~1:~(S;(E)) -~0(S;) is given by f,-'(o;)(s;e) -~;(e;t) -ei for all v; E~(S;(e)) and t E {1,...,m(i)}. (1 -~k (1) Ek)
Flirthermore C(I',v;) -C(I'(E), f;(o';)) for all o-; E 0(S;).
Theorem 4.1. 
Let I' E MG(n, (r(1), ... , r(n))),e a mistake vector in jji-1 Rmt'~and v E r[~1 0(S~(e)).
Then E;(T,c-;) -E;(I'(e),~-;) for all i E N.
Proof
Let r -(0(S,),...,0(S"),K,,-..,K") E MG(n,(r(1),...,r(n))).
A strategy combination o-(ol,...,o" (k))) for each k and lim~-.,,, v(k) -o. The following observations can be made. ,(r(1),...,r(n)) ). Then
(1) there exists at least one perfect strategy combination.
(2) if v is perfect for r, then Q is an equilibrium point of r.
(3) if r(i) -1 for all i E N, then perfect equilibrium points correspond to perfect Nash equilibría.
Proof: (3) is obvious and (1) can be proved using the compactness of the strategy apace jj~I~(S~). For the proof of (2) we will use theorem 3.2. Let~E]-jj-1 0(S~) be perfect in r. Take a sequence {e(k)}w I of mistake vectors and {Q(k)}k-1 of strategy combinations such that limky" e(k) -0, o(k) E EP(r(E(k))) for all k and limky" o(k) -Q.
By theorem 3.2, we only need to show that C(r,v;) C I for some I E E; (r,v-;) .
For every t E C(r, v;) and sufficiently large k it holds that a;(s;t) ) ei(k) and hencẽ
(k).(9u)~E,(k)-
This implies C(r,o;) C C(r(e(k)),v(k);) for large k. Since v(k) is an equilibrium point of the perturbed game r(e(k)), theorem 3.2 implies the existence of
Ik E E;(r(e(k)),Q(k)-;) such that C(r(e(k)),~(k);) C Ik. By theorem 4.1 it holds that (r(E(k)),a(k)-~) -E:(r,~(k)-:).
Therefore C(r, a;) C C(r(e(k)), o(k);) C Ik for large k for some Ik E E;(r, v(k) 
-;).
Draw a subsequence {v(l)}~1 such that I~-I for all L. Since lim~-.,o a(C)-; -a-;
and Í is efficient for all v(l)-; in I', 1 is efficient for v-; in I'. So we can find a set I E E;(r,o-;) with 1 C I. So we may conclude that there is an I E~;(r,o-;) such that c(r,~;)CÍCI. (1, q) is not perfect. It is seen that any probability diatribution p in 0(Si(e)) close to p-1 has the property that BZ (I'(e),p) -{1}. (Uae theorem 3.2 and 4.1.) This implies tliat for any sequence of mistake vectors {(e(k))}~1 and any sequence {(pk,qk)}k 1 such that (p~`,qk) E EP(P(e(k))), limky"e(k) -0 it holds that qk -i 1. Notice that all cther equilibrium points are perfect.
It is not difficult Lo ahow that the set PEP(r) of all perfect equilibria for r ia closed in
In figure 2 the equilibria and perfect equilibria aze depicted. 
Characterizations of perfect equilibrium points
In this section we provide alternative characterizations of perfect equilibria inspired by the characterizationa of perfect Nash equilibria given by van Damme (1991) .
For this we first introduce the concept of e-perfectness for completely mixed strategy combinations.
Deftnition 5.1: MG(n, (r(1), ..., r(n)) ) and e E R,e~0.
A atrategy combination v with C(I',v;) -{1,...,m(í)} for all i E N is called e-perfect if there exista for every í E N an I; E E;(I', Q-:) such that Q;(e;~) C e for all t~I;.
Theorem 5.2:
Let T E MG (n,(r(1),...,r(n) )) and Q E]-jj-1 0(S~).
The following three assertiona are equivalent.
(1) v is a perfect equilibrium point for I'. 
This implies that o(k) E EP(I'(E(k))) for large k. o
Recall the result that any equilibrium point for a finite multicriteria game I' is a Nash equilibrium in a related trade-off game and, conversely, that every (trade-off) Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium. For perfect equilibrium points this type of result does not 
(k) E NE(I'(a)(e(k))).
Then Q(k) E EP(P(e(k)) (see Theorem 2.2) and thus o E PEP(I').R
eexamining example 2.3 we have Furthermore, strictly perfect equilibria (Okada 1984) or stability concepts as e.g. introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) might be studied.
A second remark is on the domination concept used in the definition of equilibria. We could have used a weaker domination concept: for P C R~we call x E P undominated (in P) if {y E R~~y~x} (1 P-{x}, where y 1 x if and only if y;~x; for all i E{1, ..., t}. For this specific choice we denote the set of equilibria of a multicriteria game r by SEP(r). Clearly SEP(r) C EP(r). Moreover, it can be shown that {o~o E NE(r(a)), a-(a(1),...,a(n)) E II" ,Do~;~} C SEP(r), where t1a1;~-{a E R't`l~~i~'i ai -1, ai~0 all t}.
If we would define perfect strategy combinations similarly to g4 using the weaker domination concept, one can not immediately conclude that every perfect combination is an equilibrium point, due to the fact that SEP(r) need not be closed. It is (example 4.4) clear that ( l t~, l) ís a perfect pair in the weak sense too since it is a limit of totally mixed equilibria. It is however not an equilibrium point itself.
